Colour violence, deadly geographies, and the meanings of "race" in Brazil[1]

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the relationships between "race" and violent victimization, and between "race" and support for violent practices of social control in Brazil, using nationally representative survey data. I start from the premise that "race" is a set of relational practices rather than bounded "racial groups." I operationalize this relational understanding of "race" methodologically by triangulating three measures of "race" — self-identified "census race," interviewer-identified skin colour, and racial composition of the municipality — in conjunction with measures of class, gender and space. I find that whiter geographic spaces have lower overall levels of violent victimization, but that interviewer-identified darker-skinned *individuals* are disproportionately victimized in these whiter geographic spaces. Controlling for other variables, self-identified census race is not correlated with violent victimization. I find that public support for violent practices can best be understood by considering people's simultaneous relationships to race, gender, class and spatial categories and hierarchies.

Social scientists have long contrasted Brazil and the US as having different racial systems, the former being based on a continuum of colour gradations, without clear boundaries between blacks and whites and peaceful racial conviviality, and the latter containing a rigid colour line and violent racial conflict (e.g., Pierson 1967; Nogueira 2007; see Telles 2004 for a review). Yet statistical studies show that Brazilians labelled as "black" (*negros*, or those classified as *preto* or *pardo)* are more likely to die from violence compared to those classified as "white" (*brancos*) (Cano 2010; Waiselfisz 2012; Sinhoretto and Lima 2015). The key to solving this puzzle is to adopt a social constructionist approach to race. Racialization (and ethnicization) is a set of culturally mediated, relational and often institutionalized, practices of categorization and meaning-making (Omi and Winant 1994; Brubaker 2002) that can work together to produce, reproduce, or mitigate, violence. As such, racial and ethnic violence and its legitimation may persist even in the absence of clearly bounded or salient racial groups (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Brubaker and Laitin 1998). While much previous social constructionist work on race, ethnicity and violence have focused on cases where violence strengthens racial or ethnic group identity (e.g., Luft 2015; Smångs 2016), my paper addresses a context where violence is not always ostensibly framed as "racial" or "ethnic," but where racialized and/or colour-coded ways of seeing affect the *distribution* of everyday violence.

This paper uses multivariate survey data analysis to investigate the relationship between "race" and the (re)production of violence in Brazil. I treat "race" as a social category and/or identity that can be applied to individuals or to collective entities (neighbourhoods, institutions, etc.) and a lens through which social actors may perceive their social reality. I investigate how three measures of "race"— self-identified "census race," interviewer-identified skin colour, and the racial composition of the municipality— relate to violent victimization, and to public opinion regarding violent practices of social control. I investigate how the relationships between race/colour and violent practices and opinions vary depending on other social locations and identities based on geography, class and gender. I find that whiter geographic spaces have lower overall levels of violent victimization, but that interviewer-identified darker-skinned *individuals* are disproportionately victimized in these whiter geographic spaces. Self-identified census race has no independent correlation with violent victimization, once other measures of race and other variables are taken into account. I also find that the relationship between race/colour and public support for violent practices varies according to class, gender and spatial cleavages.

Scholars have argued that "race" and "colour" (and skin tone) are often empirically and analytically distinct (Monk 2015; 2016; Dixon and Telles 2017). Nonetheless, previous studies suggest that colour distinctions and racial discourse are closely intertwined in Brazil (e.g.,

Twine 1994; Nogueira 2007; Moraes Silva and Souza Leão 2012). Rather than a-priori

distinguishing between "race" and "colour," this paper asks what we mean more precisely when

we say that "race" affects violence in Brazil, and what we can infer about this meaning from

available statistical data. Because "race" (*raça*) is the word that Brazilian(ist) social scientists

today often use to encompass observed statistical disparities between "blacks" and "whites" in

studies about violence, I will use this terminology in the paper, while recognizing the

terminology's potential limits and possible interpretations.

Racially structured violence without races

Consistent with a social constructionist approach to race (and colour), this paper makes

three analytical moves. First, I investigate *whose* classification system matters by comparing

two measures of "race:" self-identified racial categories and interviewer-assigned skin colour. I

thus follow Roth's (2016) call for using different statistics to capture different "dimensions" of

race, such as racial identity, racial self-classification, observed race, reflected race (how people

think that others classify them), phenotype or ancestry (Roth 2016). Similar to race, the

perception and valuation of skin colour is relational and contextual (Monk 2015; 2016; Roth

2016; Dixon and Telles 2017).

Second, I posit that the objects of stigmatized classification are not only groups, individuals and their bodies, but also places and institutions. Urban ethnographers often find that neighbourhoods are classed, racialized and coded as dangerous (e.g., Sansone 2003; Wacquant 2008; Vargas and Alves 2010; Anderson 2015). As a result, the stigmatizing effects of racialization and colour distinctions may affect people living in racialized spaces regardless of their *individual* racial classification. There may also be an interaction between bodies and space, such as when black people are disproportionately policed in predominantly white spaces (McCallum 2005; Vargas and Alves 2010; Anderson 2015).

Third, I avoid the a-priori imputation of racial group interests or political cohesion that has been criticized both conceptually (e.g., Loveman 1999; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Brubaker 2002) and in practice as applied to Brazil (Blalock 1967, see footnote on page 109; Loveman 1999; Bailey 2009). Instead, I investigate how community belonging, social identity and reflexivity may influence a person's opinions regarding punishment. Following intersectional theorizing (e.g., Crenshaw 1991), I understand individuals' relationship with violence as resulting from their simultaneous engagement with multiple systems of classification, identity and stigmatization. I thus break with the common practice of explaining public opinion regarding punishment through a logic of group conflict or group threat (e.g., Weitzer and Tuch 2006; King and Wheelock 2007; Johnson 2008).

The paper also adopts a "group-less" approach to "the state," blurring the boundaries between "crime" and "punishment" as sources of violence. Rather than treating "the state" as a monolithic Leviathan (e.g., Wacquant 2014), I follow recent criminological work that argues that state and private (including criminal) organizations, with varying degrees of support from citizens, may be involved in either the management of public order, or the pursuit of private gains, often through violent means (Willis 2009; Koch 2017).

The Brazilian context

Recent scholarship has blurred the divisions that long dominated debates about race in Brazil. Previously, some scholars claimed that Brazilians have weak racial boundaries and peaceful racial conviviality (e.g., Pierson 1967; Harris 1970; Maggie 2005; Fry 2005; Nogueira 2007) while others arguing that the apparently weak racial boundaries are a form of colour-blindness that obfuscates a reality of sharp divisions between "blacks" and "whites" creating a myth of racial democracy (e.g., Nascimento [1978] 2016; Twine 1994). Instead, recent scholarship suggests *gradational* differences in socioeconomic status according to skin tone or gradational colour classification (e.g., Moraes Silva and Paixão 2014; Monk 2016; Ribeiro 2017), and an *awareness* of racism that coexists with weak racial identities or political affiliations (Bailey 2009; Alves 2016; Lamont et al. 2016; Moraes Silva and Souza Leão 2012).

However, statistical studies on the relationship between race and violence still rely on a

"methodological groupism" of sorts, by employing exclusively census-like categories as

measured in victimization surveys, police records, public health statistics, and death registries

(e.g., Cano 2010, Waiselfisz 2012).

Violence has a long history in Brazil, beginning with genocide, forced assimilation and

"pacification" policies toward rebellious Indigenous peoples (Oliveira 2014), and its massive

importation, use and violent control over African slave labour between the 16th and the 19th

centuries (Klein and Luna 2010). Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Brazilian elites

created centralized and militarized policing institutions and forcibly relocated poor populations

from the city centres to hillsides and suburbs where they lived under precarious conditions

(Holloway 1993; Fischer 2008). Following the downfall of the military dictatorship (1964-85),

which left its own legacy of torture and repression (Zaverucha 2008), violent deaths grew

exponentially. Political democratization coincided with systematic and socially unequal

violations of human rights (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Added to historical legacies was the

increased profitability of the drug trade, the increased availability of guns, the increased power

of violent criminal organizations (Zaluar 2004) and the growth in, and conditions of,

incarceration (Adorno and Salla 2007; Willis 2009; Alves 2016). Homicide rates are now

amongst the highest in the world (Murray et al. 2013). Violence against Indigenous peoples

also continues today, sponsored by both the state and private enterprise (Cunha et al., 2017).

Just as racial boundaries are blurred, so too are the boundaries of the state. Brazilians of

all social classes express support for repressive state policies when surveyed (Pandofli 1996),

and by electing tough-on-crime politicians, such as the current President, Jair Bolsonaro. State

and private organizations, often with support of unaffiliated citizens, regularly use violence to

acquire private gains (material or symbolic), and/or to control the social order. The general

sense of insecurity and de-legitimation of the police often leads middle-class and wealthy

Brazilians to seclude themselves in gated condominiums, hire private security and support

repressive police activities (Caldeira 2000; French 2013), while residents of poor

neighbourhoods rely on drug organizations and private militias to provide security. Violence-

perpetrating organizations such as the police, prisons, drug organizations, militia, and private

security firms, often exist in a symbiotic relationship with each other, through corruption and

mutual accommodation (Zaluar 2004; 2016; Willis 2009).

While statistical analyses show large disparities in violent victimization by "census

race," qualitative and mixed-methods research highlight the social processes that underlie these

disparities, even in the *absence* of distinct and mutually opposing "racial groups." Violence

toward others is often justified and/or motivated primarily through understandings of difference

based class, space, and gender, but these categories of difference are often imbricated with racial logics and colour differentiations (Caldeira 2000; Moraes Silva and López 2015). Hence, Brazilians who identify as "middle-class" may nonetheless support policing practices (by public or private security agents) that discriminate on the basis of skin colour. The unequal distribution of violent labour *within* violence-producing organizations also heightens racial disparities: young, poor and dark-skinned men are disproportionately represented among low-level police officers (Sansone 2003) and as "soldiers" for drug organizations (Zaluar 2004). Brazilians classified as *preto* or *pardo* are disproportionately incarcerated, which not only exposes them to prison violence, but also ties them to drug organizations that control prison life and prisoners' relationships in the outside world (Alves 2016).

Brazilian regions, or people whose identities are attached to regional origins, are racialized and variously associated with violence. São Paulo and the South of Brazil have larger European-descendant populations, and sharper divisions between blacks and whites, compared to the Northeast, where racial lines are more blurred (Guimarães 1999; Telles 2004; Blake 2011; Weinstein 2015). Regional mythologies evoke varying repertoires of racialized violence, such as the Paulista myth of the *bandeirantes* conquering and civilizing the country's interior (Weinstein 2015), or the myth of the Northeastern *cangaceiros*, viewed sometimes as lawless and backward troublemakers, and other times as heroes fighting against central

authorities (Barbosa 2014). Empirically, the relationship between region and violence has changed in the 2000s, when shifts in local security policies and changes in drug trading routes led homicide rates in the Northeastern and Northern region to grow and surpass those of the Southeast.

In the largest Brazilian cities, poorer neighbourhoods are generally racially diverse but contain a more *pretos* and *pardos* (Telles 2004), and have more violence (Vargas and Alves 2010).[1] Ethnographers suggest that urban Brazilians experience social difference in primarily spatial, classed and gendered terms (e.g., Zaluar 2004), but some add that black Brazilians are nonetheless *aware* of the police officers' racial or colour bias (Sansone 2003; McCallum 2005; Lamont et al. 2016), and may even display a politicized reaction to their disproportionate victimization that is expressed in the language of race and/or colour (Alves 2016).

An empirical exercise

The AmericasBarometer survey data for Brazil is a nationally representative sample of Brazil's population over 16 years old. I use data for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014. In some analyses, I pool the dataset of the three years and, when the variables of interest are only available for one year, I focus my analysis on that year (see Table 1). I use three measures of "race:" interviewer-identified skin colour, self-identified "census race" and racial composition

of the municipality. Self-identified "census race" is based on identification according to one of

the five official Brazilian census categories: *branca* (chosen by 35% of respondents); *parda*

(48%), *preta* (12%), *indígena* (Indigenous, 2%) and *amarela* ("yellow," 3%). I excluded the

latter two categories due to their small sample size. The survey instructed interviewers to match

the interviewee's facial skin tone to a palette with 11 different colours (see Telles and PERLA

2014; the colour palette is available at http://perla.soc.ucsb.edu/data/colour-palette). I collapsed

some of the smallest categories together so as to achieve at least 10% of the observations in

each category (the original colour palette numbering is retained in the tables).[2] While

interviewer-classified skin colour and self-classified race overlap significantly, there is enough

discordance to make my analysis meaningful (Table 1). Racial composition of the

municipality, a variable ranging from 0 to 1 (0% to 100%), was constructed based on the 2010

census, by dividing the number of people who self-identified as *branca* by the total municipal

population. Municipal racial compositions were then matched to the Americasbarometer

respondents' place of residence.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The dependent variables measure the risk of violent victimization of individuals and

geographic units and the probability of support for violent practices. I include two measures of

victimization. *Murder in the neighbourhood* is coded "1" if the person answered "yes" to the question: "In the last 12 months, were there murders in the neighbourhood or place where you live?," and "0" otherwise. *Violent victimization* is coded "1" if the respondent reported having been, in the last twelve months, a victim of a crime *and*, in a follow-up question, indicated that this crime was: robbery with assault or physical threats; armed robbery; assault but not robbery; rape or sexual assault; or kidnapping.[3] I assigned the value of zero to respondents who either did not report a crime, or reported crimes labelled "non-violent" such as burglary of one's home when no one was there, vandalism, unarmed robbery without assault of physical threat, or "other." In some models, I break down this variable into *local violent victimization*, indicating whether or not a person reported a violent crime that happened *within* the neighbourhood or home; and *extra-local* violent victimization, indicating whether the respondent suffered a violent crime *outside* of their neighbourhood or home. Variables on support for violent practices are based on answers to whether the person would approve of: someone killing their son or daughter's rapist; someone killing a person who frightens their community; the police torturing someone to obtain information about a crime; a man hitting an unfaithful wife (1=approve; 0=disapprove), and whether the person agrees (=1) or disagrees (=0) that "the best way to combat crime is to hire private security."

The models include other variables such as educational level, family or household income,[4] subjective class identification, region, city-size, age and gender, which serve as controls, as conditioning factors, and as explanatory variables, depending on the model.

Murder in the neighbourhood and violent victimization

According to descriptive statistics in Table 1, about half of Brazilians reported a murder in their neighbourhood, and 8% reported having been a victim of a violent crime in the previous 12 months. Violence is highest in large cities. People with higher income, higher education and upper middle or upper class identity report less neighbourhood murder than their lower-status counterparts, but the lowest income, educational and class identity groups report less individual victimization. This discrepancy may be because the latter measure captures disproportionately crimes against property, such as armed robbery, or because of class-based differences in reporting. Women report less violent victimization compared to men, perhaps because Brazilian women are disproportionately victimized by family members and relatives and thus may be hesitant to report (Zaluar 2009). Younger people are more likely to be victimized compared to older ones.

Table 1 shows a contradictory correlation between an individual's reported violent victimization, self-identified race and interviewer-identified skin colour. *Pardos* are more

victimized than either *brancos* or *pretos*, and the two lightest interviewer-rated skin tone

categories report the least violent victimization. More consistent is the relationship between

space and victimization. Self-identified *pretos* or *pardos*, and those identified as darker-skinned

by the interviewer, are more likely to report murder in their neighbourhood, compared to those

who self-identify as *branco* and interviewer-identified light-skin individuals. Further,

Brazilians who live in municipalities with 60% or more whites experience both individual

violence and neighbourhood-level violence at a lower rate than the average for the overall

population. Regions with smaller white populations — the North, Northeast and Centre-West

— have more violence compared to the whiter regions of the South and Southeast.

Geographic units with more whites generally have less violence, even after *controlling*

for individual racial and colour classification and other individual and geographic

characteristics (Table 2). Controlling for region and other variables, the larger the percentage of

whites in the respondents' municipality, the less likely respondents are to report murder in their

neighbourhood, and people living in municipalities with over 60 per cent whites are less likely

to report violent victimization compared to those living in the remaining municipalities.

Brazilians in the Northeast report more neighbourhood murder (though not more individual

violent victimization) compared to other Brazilian regions.

Taking spatial context and other variables into account, however, *individual-level* racial

colour identification are not straightforwardly correlated with violent victimization or

neighbourhood violence (models 1-3). Amongst those with the same interviewer-identified skin

colour and with similar characteristics, people who identify as *preta* are *less* victimized under

both measures compared to those classified as *pardas* or *brancas*. There is also no consistent

relationship between interviewer-rated skin tone and either neighbourhood murder or

individual violent victimization.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Models 4-5 suggest an *interaction* between municipal racial composition and

individual-level racial and skin colour classification, in determining individual-level violent

victimization. Controlling for other characteristics, the interviewer-identified darkest-skinned

Brazilians (8 and above) who live in municipalities with more than 60% whites are more likely

to report violent victimization, compared to their lighter-skinned counterparts in these

municipalities, and compared to those classified in the same skin colour categories in

municipalities with less than 60% whites. Further analysis reveals that, in majority white

municipalities, interviewer-identified skin colour is correlated with *extra-local* violence (model

6), but not with *local* violence (model 7). Amongst people who interviewers identify as having

the *same skin colour*, and controlling for of other social characteristics and identities, those

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who self-identify as *preto* are *less* vulnerable to individual violent victimization and

neighbourhood murder than those who identify as *pardo*. The differences between *pretos* and

pardos emerge in municipalities with over 60% *brancos*, but are not statistically significant for

municipalities with lower proportions of *brancos*.

The top row in Figure 1 shows the average predicted probability of violent

victimization as a result of simultaneous variation of interviewer-assigned skin colour and

racial self-identification, based on models 3 and 5 and a similar regression only for

municipalities with less than 40% white inhabitants. The interviewer-identified darkest-skinned

Brazilians who live in predominantly white municipalities are more than twice as likely to be

victimized as those who identify themselves within the same racial category, but are identified

by interviewers as lighter-skinned. But among those with the same interviewer-assigned skin

tone, self-identified *pretos* are less likely to be victimized compared to *brancos* or *pardos*.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Support for violent social control

None of the violent practices investigated have the approval of the majority of

respondents, though about 30% approve of killing a person who has raped their son or daughter

and torturing a criminal to get information, and 40% agree that hiring private security is the

best way to fight crime. 14% approved of the police killing someone who frightened the

community and 4.5 approved of husbands hitting their unfaithful wives. Generally, more

developed places (larger cities, the Southeast region), higher class people (higher income,

higher education, identifying with higher social class), and women are equally or more likely

than their counterparts to agree that hiring private security is a solution to crime, but less likely

to approve of interpersonal or police violence (see Table 1 for details). Regression analyses

(Table 3) reveal that, controlling for other variables, Brazilians of the southernmost region are

generally more in favour of vigilante justice measures (killing a daughter's/son's rapist, hitting a

betraying wife, killing someone who frightens the community) while those in the Southeast are

the least in favour of police torture and most in favour of hiring private security. With the

exception of approving killing a person who frightens the community, people in the Northeast

are no more likely than those in other regions to support vigilante or private forms of violence,

net of other variables.

Descriptive statistics show a contradictory relationship between the three measures of

"race" and support for violent social control. Self-identified *brancos* are most likely to support

the use of private security, but *pretos* are most likely to support killing a person who frightens

their community, and *pardos* are most likely to support a man hitting an unfaithful wife. *Pretos*

and *pardos* show equal support for police torture, and more so than *brancos*. Support for these

measures does not vary consistently along the interviewer-rated skin colour scale. Finally,

people living in municipalities with over 60% whites have similar rates of support for these

measures as the overall population, though with slightly lower support for police torture and

slightly higher support for using private security.

Initial regression analyses (Tables 3 and 4) suggest that interviewer-assigned skin tone

has *no* statistically significant correlation with any of the attitude measures (Table 3, models 1,

2, 4, 6 and 7) once racial self-identification and other variables are controlled for, but that,

controlling for skin colour and other characteristics, *pretos* and *pardos* are more likely to

approve measures that regulate sexual relations in the community. However, in municipalities

with over 60% whites, having the darkest interviewer-rated skin tone in municipalities makes

one *less* likely to approve of a husband hitting his unfaithful wife and approving of killing a

person who frightens their community (models 3 and 5). This is exactly the population that is

most individually victimized (see Table 2). While not statistically significant (therefore the

interaction models were not included in Table 3, but see Figure 1), the direction and magnitude

of the effects suggest that the (interviewer-identified) darkest-skinned individuals in

municipalities with over 60% whites are also least likely to support other violent measures such as police torture, or killing a son or daughter's rapist.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Results above suggest diverging patterns for attitudes that relate to the regulation of *sexual* relationships, on the one hand, and attitudes that relate to the general policing of the community, on the other. Not surprisingly, subsequent analyses reveal that such attitudes are *gendered* (Table 4, and Figure 1). In majority white municipalities (>60%), women who identify as *preta* are significantly more likely than those who identify as *parda* or *branca* to support killing someone who frightens their community, or to support police torture, but this relationship does not exist for men. However, only *preta* women who are identified by interviewers as medium or light-skinned —i.e., a *minority* of self-identified *preta* women— support these measures. Overall, self-identified *preto* and *pardo men* are more likely than their *branco* counterparts to approve violent measures that involve regulating sexual relationships (killing a son's/daughter's rapist and hitting a betraying wife). Interviewer-assigned skin tone does not have a statistically significant relationship with these dependent variables in the models broken down by gender, although the direction of effects indicates a higher-than-average rejection of these measures amongst the darkest-skinned.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Discussion and conclusion

This paper analysed the relationship between "race" and violence in Brazil without

assuming separate and cohesive racial groups. First, results suggest that researchers should

look for violence-producing racialization beyond the individual, by showing that Brazilians

who live in municipalities with more self-identified white people are less likely to report

violent victimization, *above and beyond* their individual self-classification or interviewer-

identified skin colour. Future research might look for racialization in the form of racial

stereotyping of larger geographic locations, such as regions, and investigate the extent to which

racialization interacts with regional disparities in violence rates.

Second, the results provide insight into *whose* classification matters for violent

outcomes, and *in what context*. Respondents who are classified *by interviewers* as dark-

skinned, *and* who lived in majority-white municipalities, have much higher rates of

victimization than those who are classified as lighter-skinned in the same municipalities. This

interviewer-identified colour disparity in victimization occurs predominantly *outside of* these

individuals' neighbourhoods. This speaks to themes of *hypervisibility* (or "hard spaces") that

both U.S. and Brazilian urban ethnographers have identified (e.g., Sansone 2003; Anderson

2015), where individuals coded as "black" or dark-skinned are seen as threatening and thus in

need of disproportionate policing in predominantly white environments. Here, it is not

surprising that *interviewers'* classification better predicts victimization outside the

neighbourhood of residence, as the interviewer, like the potential victimizer, is usually an

outsider to the interviewee's neighbourhood.

Interviewer skin colour classification and interviewee racial self-classification overlap

significantly, but once we control for this overlap, self-identified *pretos* are less victimized as

compared to *pardos* with the same interviewer-identified skin tone: a person with darker skin

tone would identify as *preta* if they lived in a wealthier/whiter community. This is because,

controlling for interviewer skin colour classification, the remaining variation in interviewee's

self-classification probably reflects aspects of interviewee's racial identity that may not be

shared with community outsiders. These racial identities may reflect factors beyond skin

colour, such as politicization of blackness, ancestry, as well as racial, colour and other status

hierarchies established *within particular communities*. Monk 2015, for instance, found that skin

colour hierarchies drawn *amongst* members of the black community in the United States matter

more for certain health outcomes than how community outsiders perceive them. While not

defined *along* racial lines as in the United States, Brazilian community belonging that affects

racial classification may be delineated along neighbourhood, class or family and friendship

networks. Previous research suggests that criteria for racial classification in Brazil are more

polarized in whiter social environments, such as higher social classes or in particular

geographic areas (Telles 2004; Telles and Paschel 2014; Lamont et al. 2016). Controlling for other factors, then, identifying as *parda* may be a proxy for living in a more disadvantaged community, which may explain why they are more victimized than those who identify as *preto* but who are similarly classified in terms of skin tone by the interviewer.

Third, analyses of public support for violent practices caution scholars to move beyond "group conflict" frameworks. Instead, we should investigate the processes of reflexivity, identity and community belonging that mediate the relationship between these attitudes and racialization. People are simultaneously located in class, gender, spatial, racial and colour hierarchies. We should investigate which identities and classification practices are salient for explaining particular attitudes, and which ones work in the background to provide context for the operation of the other identities and categories. The paper finds that upper/upper middle-class identity is associated with support for using private security. While mobilized around class identities, this private security may stereotype and violently target people identified along skin colour lines. Similarly, men who identify as lower-class or as *pardo* — two identities that may be proxies for living in poorer communities — may support the sexual regulation of their communities through vigilantism to compensate for limited access to the police or court system for such purposes. On the other hand, a woman with light or medium skin colour may self-identify as *preta* as a reflection of her racialized status *within* whiter and wealthier families,

neighbourhoods and kinship structures. My data suggests that these lighter-skinned *preta*-

identified women in whiter environments are more likely than their *branca* or *parda*

counterparts to support police torture or killing someone that frightens the community, perhaps

responding to a greater vulnerability from *within* their (majority white) community.

Interviewer-identified darkest-skinned Brazilians who live in predominantly white

municipalities, who are also the most vulnerable to violence, are generally less likely than their

lighter-skinned counterparts to support violent measures of social control. These results should

caution researchers of race in Brazil from equating self-identification as *pardo* to lack of

awareness of racism (colour consciousness). Instead, it seems clear that people may be

reflexive about how outsiders may violently stigmatize them due to their skin colour, without

necessarily identifying as *preto* in a survey question.

Endnotes

[1] The story in this paper is mostly about urban violence: 80 per cent of the Brazilian

population, and 93 per cent of my survey respondents, live in urban areas.

[2] I experimented with both higher and lower levels of aggregation, but collapsing categories 7

and 8 together causes a loss of variation in the results, while maintaining categories above 8

left too few cases to allow for statistical analysis

[3] The AmericasBarometer only has self-reported measures of violent victimization, which likely leads to subjective evaluation and under-reporting. The murder in the neighbourhood reported correlates well with the actual murder rate in the respondents' municipality (.37). The measure of violent victimization, because of how it is framed (as being victim of a crime) is likely to under-estimate kinds of violence that is normalized in society, such as domestic violence and police violence. On the other hand, self-rated victimization often captures violence not found in police reports, which tend to be biased by the police's individual or corporate interests. While a triangulation between different measures of victimization would be ideal, to date, as far as I know, no dataset exists that would allow me to triangulate *both* different of race — as I do in this paper — and of violence, at the individual level.

[4] The survey collected data on household income in 2012 and 2014 and on family income in 2010. Income data was originally available as a set of aggregate nominal income categories that are not consistent across years, which I converted into quantiles in relation to the income distribution among survey respondents for that year, choosing the approximate quantile cutoffs that could be compared across years.

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