Canadian Multiculturalism and Brazilian Racial Democracy in two Newspapers: (Post-?) Colonial Entanglements of Race, Ethnicity, Nationhood and Culture¹

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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the shifting meanings of 'culture' in newspaper articles on multiculturalism in Canada and on racial democracy in Brazil from the 1950s to the 2010s. In the 1950s and 60s, discourse on racial democracy in Brazil and multiculturalism in Canada relied on an idea of “culture” akin to the notion of “civilization,” i.e., an explicit recognition of the existence and particularity of the dominant language and religion and its location in dominant institutions, but often supported by an ethnocentric perspective. Since the 1980s, discourse on racial democracy and multiculturalism in the two newspapers increasingly discussed the topic of racism, but the idea of “culture” has become associated with embodied characteristics of people of color, while the practices imposed by dominant institutions has become invisible or understood as universal. While race scholars suggest that we abandon the language of “culture” to lay bare the reality of racism and social inequality, I argue that anti-racist agendas should also make visible the ongoing existence of culturally assimilationist practices and institutions and their colonial roots.

Keywords: multiculturalism, racial democracy, Brazil, Canada, culture, race

Introduction

This paper examines the shifting use of the idea of “culture,” in relation to discourse about race, ethnicity and nationhood, in two newspapers' narratives about racial democracy in Brazil and multiculturalism in Canada from the mid-twentieth century until the early 2010s. Brazilian racial democracy and Canadian multiculturalism are two paradigmatic examples of alternative ways to conciliate national identity with racial and ethnic inclusion. Canadian multiculturalism celebrates cultural difference, and Brazilian racial democracy celebrates racial mixture. The national narrative of Canadian multiculturalism is often seen as more successful than German ethnic nationalism or French republicanism, for example, in allowing nation-states to recognize racial and ethnic diversity while preserving national integrity (Bloemraad 2007). Similarly, racial democracy and, more broadly, Latin American mestizaje ideologies were once thought of as racially inclusive national projects at a time when many countries still equated progress with whiteness (Appelbaum et al. 2003; Loveman 2014).

Nonetheless, scholars of “race” in the Americas have argued that racial democracy, mestizaje, multiculturalism and diversity discourses and policies often reify cultural differences of subordinate racial and ethnic groups, while failing to address underlying racism and social inequality (Bell and Hartmann 2007; Thobani 2007; Hooker 2008; Henry et al. 2010; Paschel 2015; Winter 2015). For these authors, such discourses and policies are in consonance with a “new racism” or “cultural racism,” a new kind of racism that emerged after World War II (or, in US literature, after the end of Jim Crow segregation), where ideas about inherent cultural
difference have replaced biological justifications for racial oppression and racism (Lentin 2005; Bonilla-Silva 2013).

Other scholarship on multiculturalism approaches the idea of “culture” as reflecting real social phenomena, in particular linguistic and religious practices that may differ according to racial and ethnic group membership. For these scholars, nation-states encompass, and/or actively support, institutions that promote linguistic, religious and other common practices of dominant racial and ethnic groups, while constraining the practices of subordinate groups (Kymlicka 1995; Modood 1998; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Instead of directly confronting the idea of “culture” to reveal underlying material and political power relations, this literature works to make visible the linguistic and religious practices of the dominant group. Moreover, this literature describes religious and linguistic practices as being embedded within a larger—and public—organizational structure, and thus not reducible to individuals' private practices.

In dialogue with these different literatures, and based on an analysis of the content of two prominent, nationally-oriented newspapers — the Jornal do Brasil and the Globe and Mail — over a span of half a century, this paper examines how public debates about Brazilian racial democracy and Canadian multiculturalism have incorporated assumptions about the relationship between “race” and “culture” as national communities were re-imagined after the post-war demise of scientific racism.

The newspaper material shows that during the 1950’s and 1960s both Canada’s and Brazil’s national narratives presupposed an understanding of “culture”
akin to the notion of “civilization.” They portrayed the dominant “culture”— of which language and religion were important components — as embedded in institutions and practiced by (usually white, male) members of an enlightened and intelligent elite. They, furthermore, portrayed this “culture” needing to be taught and imposed onto members of subordinate racial and ethnic groups through these institutions. These dominant “cultures”— or “civilizations”— were often understood as particular and compared to others. In Canada, there was a concern with defending the French-Canadian culture from the English-Canadian culture, and the English-Canadian culture from the American culture, while in Brazil, Portuguese Christian civilization was sometimes contrasted to Anglo-American civilizations in how they managed their non-European colonial subjects.

By the 1980s, both countries’ newspaper material had shifted the use of the idea of “culture.” Racially subordinate groups became the focus of talk about “culture,” understood as embodied rather than institutionalized, while the language, religion and other practices of the dominant group and its ties to “mainstream” institutions became largely taken-for-granted. This view of “culture” continues to reproduce racialized hierarchies by essentializing the practices of subordinate racial and ethnic group members while normalizing the practices of dominant group members. Meanwhile, anti-racist activists successfully raised the issue of racism in these “mainstream” newspaper discourses, calling racial democracy a “myth” and changing the meaning of multiculturalism to include anti-racist agendas. Prevailing understandings of “culture” as embodied rather than institutionalized, and attached to racially and ethnically subordinate group members, however, remained largely
unchallenged in these mainstream public forums. In both cases, Indigenous peoples remained largely invisible in these newspapers’ discussion about these national myths.

Analyzing the two national newspapers side by side, one also notes certain cross-national differences: in the Globe and Mail, linguistic and religious differences are often at the center of the debate, while class inequality is often downplayed, while the opposite is true for Jornal do Brazil, especially since the 1980s. Overall, however, the data from the two newspapers suggest that, without examining the institutionalized dominant culture, neither a strong discourse against racism and inequality, nor paying lip service to linguistic and cultural diversity significantly challenges the broader colonial and assimilationist tendencies embedded in dominant Canadian and Brazilian national projects. The data also suggests that racial democracy in Brazil and multiculturalism in Canada have been mobilized for projects that are not simply national in scope but have other kinds of geographic identities: civilizational, (post-) colonial, urban, etc.

The analysis of the broader trends in the two countries suggests that what happened in the 20th century was not simply culturalization of “race,” i.e., a denial of the significance of racism and material inequality in contemporary societies. Rather, there was also racialization of “culture,” i.e., the view of “culture” as embodied in non-white individuals, which makes invisible the cultural colonialism of “mainstream” institutions.
The (Post-)Colonial roots of Canadian multiculturalism and Brazilian racial democracy

The ideas of racial democracy and multiculturalism derive from efforts to construct Brazil's and Canada's national imaginaries that included people of diverse racial and ethnic origins. The idea of racial democracy harks back to 19th century notions of Brazil as a “racial paradise” and to the 1920s “modernist” movements which — countering some of their contemporaries’ quest for a whiter, more European Brazil — sought to recover Brazilian roots by looking at “authentic” manifestations of Brazilian-ness in its Indigenous and African roots (Viotti da Costa 1985; Skidmore 1995; Guimarães 2003). The expression “racial democracy” is usually attributed to sociologist Gilberto Freyre (though he did not use this term, preferring “ethnic democracy”). Freyre highlighted the contribution of Africans to Brazil, portraying Brazil as racially and culturally a “mixed” and relatively racially tolerant nation.

While the expression “multiculturalism” in Canadian public discourse emerged in the 1960s, ideas about Canada as the “mosaic” were articulated since the 1920s, referring to the diverse cultures of European immigrants (Day 2000). In contrast to racial democracy, however, the most influential theorization of (and theoretical justification for) multiculturalism by Canadian scholars happened after the implementation of multiculturalism as an official policy, especially with the works of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka in the 1990s (Forbes 2019).

By the 1970s, Brazilian racial democracy and Canadian multiculturalism had become officially sanctioned national narratives by their respective states. Brazilian racial democracy became, initially, much more institutionalized in the realm of
foreign policy and relations, while the Canadian policy of multiculturalism was institutionalized domestically from the beginning. By the early 2000s, Brazilian government policy, in following black activists’ discourse, no longer supported the idea of racial democracy, while the Canadian multiculturalism policy had been significantly transformed.

Canadian and Brazilian states' changing relationship to multiculturalism and racial democracy derived from efforts by national elites to maintain internal national cohesion, define and secure national boundaries, and to project a certain image and role for these nation-states in the international arena at particular historical moments. Political and bureaucratic elites design policies and promote discourses and categorization schemes that construct national identities, with both domestic and international audiences in mind (Loveman 2014). Particularly important for understanding Canadian and Brazilian efforts at nation-making and re-making are two “post-colonial” moments: first, the initial period of nation-making in the Americas in the 19th and 20th centuries, and then, the period of decolonization of Asian and African nations after World War II. These “post-colonial” moments are also marked by new forms of colonialism: settler colonialism and the geopolitics of the cold war. Also important in re-defining national identity and understanding racial democracy and multiculturalism and its changing meaning and purpose are the transitions between these post- (or neo-) colonial moments: first, the period of the two world wars and the inter-war period; second, the period that starts in the 1980s, marked by the fall of the communist block, the democratization of Latin American states, and other changes that will be reviewed below.
**The first (post)colonial moment and the making of racial and ethnic nationals**

Between the 19th and early 20th centuries, Canada and Brazil emerged as independent nations from their respective European metropolises (England and Portugal) and national elites gradually asserted themselves as controlling their territories and populations. However, this was hardly a straightforward process of “decolonization.” Founding elites were those loyal to the respective European crowns in the wake of revolutionary forces — Brazilian independence was declared by the Portuguese royal family in Brazil, who wanted to keep their dominance in the wake of the wake of revolutionary forces on both sides of the Atlantic, and Canada emerged from British loyalists' aim to control the territory in the wake of the American revolution (in both countries the French revolution and the subsequent expansion of Napoleonic France played a major role).

Even by the early 20th century, when Brazil's new republic had severed its ties to the Portuguese monarchy and Canadian elites sought more independent policy from Britain, colonialism arguably intensified. Nation-building elites sought to expand the frontier and control the border against expanding neighboring countries, and to integrate their economies. In Brazil, elites were preoccupied with occupying the southern border with Argentina and Uruguay and the Amazon frontier, defending them from not only neighboring states but also from US and European imperial ambitions. Canadian elites sought to defend the large border with the United States, to prevent losing immigrants to its southern neighbor, and to maintain the allegiance of different Canadian populations, which threatened to join the United States. Both
Canadian and Brazilian states encouraged and sponsored Europeans to immigrate and settle on Indigenous lands (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995; Lesser 1999; Horne 2007; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Both Canada and Brazil also had policies of forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples. The *aldeamentos* in Brazil, which intensified in the early 19th century, put Indigenous peoples in villages run by Jesuits and made them do forced labor. Canada implemented a series of policies aimed at 'enfranchising' Indigenous peoples, tightly regulating their livelihoods and creating residential schools, where they were forced to assimilate into Christianity and to abandon their language, culture and ties to family and communities (Campbell 2008; Carneiro da Cunha 2012; TRC 2015).

But Canadian and Brazilian elites' main worry was populations that, in their own view, could not as easily be eliminated or assimilated. Brazilian white elites felt threatened by a large population of Afro-Brazilian descendants of slaves, who were seen as potentially disloyal and unfit for citizenship in a modern nation. As foreign race scientists visited Brazil and considered the country due for degeneracy, Brazilian elites re-fashioned their own version of race science to highlight the positive value of race mixture (Skidmore 1995). English-speaking, Protestant Canadian elites faced the challenge of incorporating and controlling a French-speaking, majority Catholic population. After a rebellion based on republican ideals of the French and American revolutions was crushed by British authorities in what today is Quebec in the late 1830s, the Catholic Church came to dominate politics, local identity and social life in what today is Quebec, until Catholic dominance was challenged in the 1960s by the Quiet Revolution (Zubrzycki 2013). Canadian and Brazilian elites used select
European immigrants to counter the perceived challenged both by French Canadian and Afro-Brazilian populations. While Brazilian elites encouraged Europeans to immigrate and “whiten” the population (Skidmore 1995), Canadian immigration policy sought to favor and invigorate English-speaking populations to ensure that French-speaking Canadians would not be the majority (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995; Day 2000). In both countries, Asian immigrants were considered by some a source of cheap and efficient labor, but also racially inferior and untrustworthy. When Asian migration was legally forbidden in Canada and the United States in the early twentieth century, Japan made an agreement with Brazil that allowed millions of Japanese immigrants into Brazil (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014).

War, crisis, migration, nation-making

The two world wars and the inter-war period brought about a reconfiguration of the role of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Canada's and Brazil's nation-building projects. The First World War brought a significant decline in global migration, and the 1930s were a period of anti-immigrant sentiment in both places, especially as Jewish, Arabic and Asian immigrants became more numerous relative to traditional Christian European immigrants. The wars also brought concerns over the loyalties of immigrants who came from “enemy” nations as Canada and Brazil took sides in the war efforts.

Despite growing xenophobia and antisemitism and ongoing racism of the period, wartime concerns created policies and allegiances that arguably led to the beginnings of official recognition of multiculturalism and racial democracy.
(Guimarães 2001; Wood and Gilbert 2005). In terms of linguistic diversity, Brazilian and Canadian policies with similar wartime aims of gaining immigrants' allegiance and spreading government propaganda resulted in opposite effects. Brazilian government prohibited all foreign-language media and schools, and Portuguese-language education and media was imposed on all immigrant populations (Seyferth 1997; Lesser 1999; Schwartzman et al. 2000). In contrast, the Canadian government made distinctions between “enemy aliens” and “allied aliens” during the wars, and promoted foreign language media in order to gain allied aliens' trust and spread state propaganda in their own languages (Pal 1993). Vargas's nationalist policies had some symbolically and materially inclusionary consequences for Afro-Brazilians: government support for national radio and cultural events helped spread music made by Afro-Brazilians to national and international audiences; and quotas that reserved jobs for nationals and thus helped Afro-Brazilians get employment previously reserved for immigrants (Vianna 1995; Guimarães 1997).

The second (post-) colonial moment and the making of official multiculturalism and racial democracy

Between World War II and the 1980s, Canadian and Brazilian political elites sought to position themselves and their countries in the context of an increased anti-racist and anti-colonialist international climate. This period was marked by the African and Asian decolonization movements, the rejection of scientific racism by prominent scientists, the publicization of the atrocities of the Holocaust, the US civil rights movement, and the movement against Apartheid in South Africa. The same
period is also “colonial” in the sense of being in the context of the Cold War: movements for national liberation and social justice were often in allegiance with the geopolitical, cultural and economic dominance of the United States or the Soviet Union, against the encroachment of the others' power, or finding ways to position themselves against this duality. Also important was the emergence and rise to prominence of the United Nations and other international organizations as mediators of international cooperation and communication. These organizations linked states to each other and to international networks of academics, policymakers and activists. Canadian and Brazilian states’ official endorsement of multiculturalism and racial democracy in the 1970s is, to some extent, a response to this global context.

Canada's official multiculturalism grew out of the government’s attempts to preserve national cohesion and integrity in response to the rise of Quebec nationalism during the 1960s. Quebec's nationalist movement, in turn, was the result of an unlikely allegiance between Quebec's student movements inspired by civil rights and anti-colonialist struggles abroad and on campus, labor and working-class movements, and nationalist ethnolinguistic movements (Mills 2010). Quebec's Quiet Revolution also promoted secularism and broke from the dominance of the Catholic Church, transforming Quebec' primary cultural identity from a religious to a linguistic one (Zubrzycki 2013). Quebec's separatist movement grew and continued after the 1960s, and the threat that it might break apart from Canada gave rise to a series of compromises with the Canadian government, including greater provincial autonomy including control of immigration policies, and the policy of bilingualism.
In 1969, the Canadian government created a Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, and convened a series of consultations with leaders of various other “ethnic” organizations who expressed the concern that Canada was not bicultural but multicultural. Ukrainian-Canadian representatives insisted on their role as one of the “founding peoples” of Canada and on having the right to separate institutions and Ukrainian-language instruction. Jewish-Canadian representatives asked to remove the language of race from the government reports. Indigenous representatives asked, among other things, for support for Indigenous-run education. Eventually, these consultations led the government to formulate a policy of “Multiculturalism within a bi-lingual framework,” which accepted that Canada was multicultural and eliminated the “founding races” language from official documents, but ignored demands from non-Francophone groups for institutional support for greater linguistic plurality (Thobani 2007; Haque 2012). In the 1970s, the official multiculturalism policies counted on a small budget, used mainly for promoting arts and festivals, while federal spending promoting French-English bilingualism was much larger (Forbes 2019). Multiculturalism was thus institutionally separate not only from policies toward French-speaking Canadians, but also from policies related to Indigenous peoples, whose lives were regulated by the Department of Indian Affairs. Assimilationist policies such as residential schools were still in force in the 1960s, though they slowly declined thereafter and the Indian Act was gradually amended to reduce restrictions on Indigenous linguistic, religious and other practices and to include Indigenous people as citizens of Canada with voting rights (Campbell 2008; TRC 2015).
But the second post-colonial moment had more long-term and indirect effects on Canadian multiculturalism. Representatives of Third World countries, increasingly present in international forums, pushed countries like Canada, the United States, Australia and the European countries to lift their explicit racial barriers to immigration. This led to an influx of non-European immigrants from the 1970s onward (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Emboldened by US Civil Rights and other anti-racist and anti-colonial movements, new immigrants to Canada and their children, allied with longer-standing racial and ethnic minorities, pushed multiculturalist institutions to address issues of racism (Stasiulis 1989). In contrast, Brazil had another wave of immigration in the immediate post-war period, but it was mostly from southern Europe, and the country became extremely closed to immigration for the rest of the 20th century.

The global post-war context had contradictory effects on the Brazilian governments' stance on “race” and racial democracy. In the 1950s, lobbied by elite members of the Portuguese community living in Brazil, Brazil allied with Portugal's Salazar regime and supported the Portuguese continued domination of its African colonies. Salazar counted on the allegiance of Gilberto Freyre himself, who extended his racial democracy idea into the ideology of Luso-Tropicalism, which claimed that Portuguese colonialism was more benign compared to those of other European powers. In the early 1960s, presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart pursued what was called an “independent foreign policy” in allegiance with the emerging Third World, supporting decolonization movements in Africa and highlighting Brazil's historical ties to African cultures and societies. The subsequent military dictatorship
(1964-85) gradually moved from supporting Portuguese colonialism to a greater strategic alignment with newly independent African countries (Dávila 2010). Meanwhile, the Brazilian governments' developmentalist project enhanced inequality amongst the Brazilian population, increasing the gap between poorer (and, on average-darker-skinned) and wealthier (and whiter) Brazilians, while promoting the occupation of the Amazon region, thus encroaching into Indigenous territories and livelihoods.

But other international developments led to a debunking of racial democracy as a myth, and helped with the denunciation of racism within Brazil. After World War II, the newly created UNESCO became a major arena for natural and social scientists to challenge scientific racism (Lentin 2005). UNESCO commissioned a study of race relations in Brazil, aimed at portraying a country free of racism that could serve as a model to others. Brazilian and foreign sociologists funded by UNESCO, however, found that racism in Brazil was widespread, and helped inaugurate a national public debate on the nature of race and racism in Brazil (Maio 1999). Also influential in this debate were black Brazilian activists, who connected their struggles with those of the US civil rights movement and of African decolonization movements. Since the 1960s, Brazilian black activists and social scientists increasingly contested racial democracy as a “myth” that led Brazilians to deny racism and was counter-productive in the anti-racist struggle (Guimarães 2001; Telles 2004; Alberto 2011).

1980s-2010s: Institutionalization of minority rights, and securitization
The 1980s and 1990s brought further changes in the global world order, as well as in the internal politics of these two countries. It marked the end of the cold war, a resurgence of ethno-nationalist movements and conflicts around the world, the democratization of countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America. International organizations increasingly went beyond defending universal human rights and individual freedoms to also supporting minorities’ collective cultural and political rights. Many countries drafted new constitutions, or amended old ones, which incorporated these new international norms on minority rights. International human rights networks developed, composed of international organizations, academic and policy experts, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and national minority rights activists (Kymlicka 1998; Niezen 2003; Htun 2004; Paschel 2015). The legacies of the US civil rights movement, institutionalized through affirmative action policies, travelled among English-speaking countries of the Global North, pushed by children of Third World immigrants whose parents had arrived in the previous decades, influencing the introduction of “positive discrimination” policies in the UK, Employment Equity Act (1986) in Canada, and the reintroduction of racial statistics in both countries (Stasiulis 1989; Boyd et al. 2000; Bleich 2003). Indigenous peoples from North America and Australia also increasingly took their demands to international forums, as a means to exert pressure on their own states (Niezen 2003). In the 1990s and early 2000s, Latin American Indigenous and Afrodescendant movements leveraged these transnational networks and pressured their democratizing states to draft policies specifically geared toward these populations (Htun 2004; Loveman 2014; Paschel 2015).
In 1982, Canada repatriated its constitution, separating it from the British legal system. The new Canadian constitution, and its subsequent amendments (the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown accord) generated struggles over self-government and autonomy between the Federal Government, which represented the interests of the English-speaking majority, the Quebec movement for independence, and Indigenous peoples. Canadian Indigenous groups mobilized international organizations to defend their interests, sometimes in conflict with the Canadian government and Quebec. The Canadian government, meanwhile, fought internally and in international forums to keep the country from splintering (Niezen 2003). Referenda in Quebec in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a vote against secession, but by a narrow margin. Important in preventing secession was the vote of Quebecers of non-French and non-British descent (Winter 1995).

While originally multiculturalist policies were aimed at recognizing the contribution of descendants of other (non-English, non-French) European-origin groups to the making of the Canadian mosaic, increasingly these policies catered to people of more recent, non-European, immigrant background. In the 1970s and 80s, emerging movements of second-generation racialized Canadians pushed multicultural organizations and policies to address issues of racism. In the 1980s, multiculturalist policies and legislation, such as the Multiculturalism Act, redefined multiculturalism to address racism. In the 1990s and 2000s, there were increased concerns with managing and “integrating” newly-arrived immigrants (Stasiulis 1989; Fleras, 2009; Bloemraad 2006). By the 21st century, particularly after 9/11, policymakers increasingly used the multiculturalism framework and institutions to manage what
they saw as problematic cultural practices of immigrants, particularly those of the Muslim population (Winter 2015).

From the late 1980s to the mid-2010s, the global context and the democratic transition in Brazil brought about an increased influence of Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous movements (particularly the former) on government policy, on general institutional practices, and on the public debate. Brazil’s 1988 constitution already included a language group rights. In the 1990s, these social movements, often organized as NGOs, increasingly participated in international conferences, policy networks, and electoral politics. By the 2000s, especially after their participation in the 2001 Durban Conference on Racism, Brazilian black activists had managed to push local governments and universities to implement Affirmative Action, and to include race-targeted policies in the agenda of the Workers Party government, which ruled until 2016 (Htun 2004; Telles 2004; Paschel 2015). Since the 2016 the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff the federal government has drastically shifted toward the right, but my data does not cover the more recent period.

**Racial democracy and multiculturalism in two newspapers**

Social scientists identify media discourse as an important source of information about discursive representations and political struggles. Individuals make sense of their world by using, adapting and modifying discursive repertoires for action (categories, schemas, scripts) that they have access to (Swidler 1986). Available repertoires often vary according to national context (Lamont et al. 2016) and are provided through different means, but media is one important source of
repertoires (Entman 1989). Media also reflects the cultural repertoires of particular groups who have more connections with, or are more valued by, these media venues (Ferree 2002). Media is an arena in the “public sphere” where social movements, government actors, and other influential voices discuss racial and ethnic group rights and public policy, and a place where one can observe “mainstream” representations about different groups (Koopmans 2004; Bleich et al. 2015).

National media also help construct ideas and boundaries of nationhood. In his classic study on nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1991) identified the printing press, and in particular the newspaper, as an important means through which nations emerge and are reproduced as “imagined communities.” Perhaps less famously, and in a different chapter, Anderson argued that national identities in Latin America were created by Creole elites, i.e., local elites of European descent who developed a national identity in opposition to their metropolitan relatives, with whom they identified more readily than the non-European populations over which they ruled. The analysis of newspapers below represents these two sides of Anderson's argument: articulations of the national “imagined community” through media stories, but one that is directed at a relatively privileged, but centrally located, segment of these countries' populations. Nonetheless, the dominant discourses are important because less powerful social actors have to constantly speak to and negotiate their worldviews with the more powerful, or suffer the consequences of the latters’ actions.

The newspapers I analyze articulate some of the “collective imagination”— in its “public face”— of relatively elite, educated, geographically privileged, culturally “unmarked” and politically influential Brazilians and Canadians. Both newspapers
are read by a relatively more educated “middle-class” audience (a group that is much more elite in Brazil, given overall lower levels of education and wealth and higher inequality). These newspapers also frame themselves as national, and are located in nationally “unmarked” locations. Being one of the oldest newspapers in Brazil and located in Rio de Janeiro, Jornal do Brasil, as its name suggests (as opposed to Folha de São Paulo, for instance), aims to present a national identity, in a similar way that Rio de Janeiro's food and music has been represented as national, as opposed to regional food and music (Vianna 1995). Similarly, the Globe and Mail represents a perspective from Ontario, a regionally unmarked, centrally located (politically, symbolically and economically) English-speaking region of Canada, and thus aspires to represent a national point-of-view.

The present study should then be read alongside previous work that has studied views on racial democracy and multiculturalism in other contexts and using other methods. Other research has shown how the racial democracy ideology operates at a “grassroots” level, for instance, being appropriated by black and/or poorer Brazilians to make demands for racial equality (e.g., Bailey 2009; Moraes Silva 2016; Alberto 2011); and how Canadians of different backgrounds deploy multiculturalism to negotiate inclusivity or exclusivity in different contexts (e.g., Mackey 2002; Wood and Gilbert 2005; Winter 2015). Even studies of intellectual and political elites' views and actions regarding racial democracy and multiculturalism use varied sources, such as analysis of government documents, correspondence or other writings by politically influential people, or other media sources (some of this literature has been reviewed above). Despite its limitations, the newspaper material provides a rich longitudinal
source of information that can complement prior research and help us understand broader changes and continuities in racial, ethnic and cultural politics in these two countries.

While not based on government documents, the data provide rich information on the relationship between national politics and public discourse in that period. The news analyzed follows closely the activities of the various branches and levels of government and cite the opinion of major politicians and people working at various agencies. The newspapers often cite intellectual elites, such as professors at prestigious universities, as ‘authorities’ on various issues. These prominent figures are sometimes the signed authors of opinion pieces. Especially in the early period, speeches of presidents and high-level officials are often quoted extensively. Relatedly, the increased attention to racism over time in the two newspapers coincides with the rise in representation of people of color in government positions, as Brazilians and Canadians of color that occupy government positions are increasingly mentioned by these newspapers.²

I analyze 134 articles from the Jornal do Brasil and 204 articles from the Globe and Mail, both available in historical online databases that are searchable by keyword. Articles were selected through two subsequent sampling steps. My research assistants and I searched for the keyword “democracia racial” in the Jornal do Brasil database and for the keywords “multicultural” and “multiculturalism” in the Globe and Mail database, yielding articles from 1946 until 2010 for Jornal do Brasil (that

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² Articles with the name of the author are increasingly common in both newspapers, especially after the 1980s. In the Globe and Mail, the vast majority of signed pieces are by journalists. In Jornal do Brasil, journalists share space with academics and other public figures. The vast majority of signed authors are white.
newspaper, while popular for many decades, is now out of circulation, except online) and from 1957 to 2012 for the Globe and Mail.

To facilitate a more fine-grained, qualitative analysis, we drew subsamples out of the larger keyword-derived set. For Jornal do Brasil, we included all articles from the 1940s and 50s, every third article from the 1960s to the 1980s, every fourth article in the 1990s and all articles from 2010. For the Globe and Mail, we included all articles using the keywords in the 1950s and 1960s and, for the later decades, a subsample only of articles published every 6 months of every year. We skipped articles that were illegible or repeated and, when articles were very short advertisements for jobs, TV programming, movies, letters to the editor, etc., we sampled an additional article in the same period (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

I read all the articles in chronological order to get a general idea of the discourse and the stories presented in the article, and then selected quotes from these articles and organized them into themes and dates, making notes of the general trends in how multiculturalism and racial democracy was talked about. The main analysis presented below is qualitative and interpretive, and not based on an automatic coding scheme. Separately, my research assistants and I coded the articles for particular themes so that we could track some general patterns over time. We coded for the decade and newspaper where the article was published, whether the article was
signed or not, whether language, religion, class, race, etc, were mentioned, whether racial democracy was seen as a myth or reality.

The results of this initial coding can be seen in Figure 1. Immigration is more prevalent in the Globe and Mail discourse compared to Jornal do Brasil's, reflecting Canada's larger influx of immigrants during this period. Only 1-3 of the articles in Jornal do Brasil mentioned language in any period, while 8 mentioned religion in the 1950s and 60s. Language is more salient in the Globe and Mail's earlier articles compared to religion. The role of religion declines in subsequent decades in Jornal do Brasil, though with temporary revival in the 1980s. Mention of language remains relatively common in the Globe and Mail sample at all times, and increases in periods when Quebec’s national aspirations become salient, such as the 1960s when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was active, and during the constitutional debates of the and referenda of the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, discussions of religion in the Globe and Mail's articles grow concomitantly with the topic of immigration, becoming particularly salient in the 21st century. Race remains salient in the Jornal do Brasil articles throughout the period, probably because the term ‘racial democracy’ itself refers to race. More interestingly, racial democracy shifts from being framed as a reality by the majority of articles in the 1950s and 60s, to a divided opinion in the 1970s, to being denounced as a myth by most articles in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s — the same decade when racial democracy starts being overwhelmingly contested in Jornal do Brasil — race become associated with mentions of multiculturalism in the Globe and Mail.
Visible ‘civilizations’: 1940s-1960s

In the early period, discussions of both racial democracy in Jornal do Brasil and multiculturalism in the Globe and Mail make the dominant culture visible, see it (more explicitly in the Canadian newspaper) as upheld by institutions, and approach it ethnocentrically. In the Brazilian newspaper, narratives about racial democracy support internal colonialism, forced assimilation, and Portuguese colonialism and missionary work in Africa. In the Canadian newspaper, discussions of Canadian multiculturalism recognize English and French as languages in need of preservation in order to prevent the disintegration of the nation and define Canadian-ness. The government is expected to promote the two ‘official’ languages in its educational system and in government offices.

In the Jornal do Brasil articles from the 1940s, racial democracy is not yet well established as part of national identity, and the two articles that talk about racial democracy in the Brazilian context refer to it as a controversial theory and utopian project advocated by social scientists and with possible ties to the Soviet Union. But in the late 1950s, Jornal do Brasil reproduces a speech by President Juscelino Kubitschek describing racial democracy as a national, Christian alternative to godless communism (April 13, 1958), arguing that “the defense of nationality includes, above all, a defense of the soul, of the creed that makes us the people that we are, of the racial democracy that we are.” Material development, he adds, should be defended “within the norms of our Christian formation.”

In the 1950s and 1960s, racial democracy is often associated with Portuguese colonialism, which is seen as having supported Brazilian internal colonialism and
national unity, and as currently spreading civilization and racial tolerance to Portuguese colonies in Africa. One 1950s article in the Jornal do Brasil paraphrases Gustavo Capanema, then chair of the Chamber of Deputies, on the occasion of a visit from the president of Portugal, as saying that the Portuguese “helped Brazilians to create an immense, unified motherland, broadening our borders and fighting, shoulder to shoulder, to expel foreigners that tried to divide our territory.” Capanema is then paraphrased as saying that Brazil inherited racial democracy from Portugal, which was opposed to the myth of Aryanism and, a few paragraphs later, that Portugal and Brazil are unified by language, customs, and religion. Some articles from the 1960s continue the theme of Luso-Brazilian “enlightened” colonialism: for example, a 1966 article speaks approvingly of a treaty between Brazil and Portugal that gives Brazil access to the port of Luanda, adding that Brazilians can thank Portugal for bringing Christianity and civilization to Brazil thus “planting the seeds of racial democracy.” (Jornal do Brasil, September 4, 1966).

This discourse had significant contemporary implications. Capanema, while the minister of education in the 1940s, had played a central role in Brazil’s nationalization campaign, which promoted forced linguistic and cultural assimilation of immigrants, then seen as a national threat (Schwartzman et al. 2000). Even pro-immigrant articles of the period emphasize immigrants’ contributions to the nation through either assimilation or “internal colonialism.” In one article, a parliament member is quoted defending a law that gives the same rights to naturalized citizens as to native citizens, arguing that Italians joined Paulistas to “conquer the forest” [desbravando as matas] (Jornal do Brasil, June 17, 1957). The conquering or, more
literally translated, “de-braving” of the forest to the historical role of *bandeirantes* in hunting down and enslaving Indigenous peoples as the Brazilian colonial agriculture expended inland in the 17th century (Monteiro 2018). In the 1930s, the story of the *bandeirantes* became part of Paulista identity, which was expanded to incorporated recent European immigrants as fellow settlers and builders of the nation (Weinstein 2015). Another article argues that “[a]fter so much debate and so much incomprehension [...] we are happy to see Japanese immigrants perfectly integrated and their children fully Brazilian, mixing with the elements from other races that make our nation's people” (June 11, 1958), thus erasing the recent and conflicted history of forced assimilation of Japanese-Brazilians (Lesser 1999).

In the Globe and Mail of the 1960s, the preservation of language of both the minority and majority groups is described as important for the preservation of distinct ways of life. Language is described as learned and practiced within institutions. There is much discussion of the need to teach both French and English in schools, and of the need for government bureaucrats to be bilingual. It is not just French Canada that is described as under threat and in need of institutional support, but English Canada as well. In the 1960s, articles suggest a fear that Canada will disintegrate, not only due to Quebec nationalism, but also through cultural or territorial absorption of “English Canada” by the United States. Norman Mackenzie, the president of the Canadian Centenary Council, is quoted in 1963 as defending biculturalism as a way to discourage Quebec separatism, but also because “One result of this separation I feel sure would be the early merging of most of English Canada with the United States...” In the 1960s, the threat that the United States could absorb Canada needed
to be contained and compensated for through government control of media content and through the promotion of the distinct linguistic community of Quebec.

**Early contestations and the question of language**

Early contestations of racial democracy and multiculturalism are both related to language identities and their link with “culture,” and with national identity. In the Jornal do Brasil, as Brazilian elites shifted their allegiance from the Portuguese colonial empire to the decolonization and anti-racist demands of the emerging ‘Third World’ (Davila 2010), some articles contest Brazil’s linguistic ties with Portugal and its colonies and emphasize Brazilians’ historical African roots. In the Globe and Mail, some non-French and non-English European-origin ethnic groups contest Canada’s official bilingualism, and demand education and institutions in their own languages. The domestic politics of language are, however, never contested in the Jornal do Brasil, and the battle for non-French minority language rights is lost in Canada. In both newspapers, we see an emergence of “culture” (African or “black” in Brazil, “immigrant” in Canada) as detached from language and somewhat abstract and symbolic.

In the Jornal do Brasil, political solidarity with Africa becomes gradually associated with Brazil’s identification with African cultural roots, while Portuguese linguistic ties to Africa give way to more symbolic African ties. In a 1950s, the newspaper publishes a statement by the black activist organization Teatro Experimental do Negro, which argues that the Brazilian government should work to preserve its racial democracy internally and to join African countries' struggle against
colonialism. The same speaker, however, still talks about Brazil as part of a modern “Western Civilization” (Jornal do Brasil, May 17, 1955). Early in the 1960s, while praising Brazil’s independent foreign policy and advocating for an anti-racist stance toward South Africa, another article argues that Brazil should explore the similarity and familiarity between African and Brazilian cultures (Jornal do Brasil, April 19, 1961). In a 1980s article, Cândido Mendes criticizes Brazil’s alignment with Portuguese-language African countries noting that African independence movements were associating the language with colonialism. He suggests, instead, that Brazil should establish allegiances based on 19th century cultural and population exchanges between African slaves and Afro-Brazilian return migrants (Jornal do Brasil, September 13, 1981).

In the 1960s, the Globe and Mail reports minority groups’ demand for linguistic and, sometimes, religious accommodation, portraying “culture” as embedded in linguistic and, sometimes, religious institutions that needed to be preserved. In one article, a member of the Estonian Central Council suggests that there should be an institution where “ethnic minority groups would be able to take care of their own cultural problems and would be allowed to administer their own public and private school systems.” (Globe and Mail, Mach 29, 1965). In another article, a member of the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood complains that provincial governments are trying to assimilate ethnic minorities through “the closing of many one-room rural schools where Ukrainian was formerly taught” (Globe and Mail, December 7 1965). More “mainstream” voices regard the idea of keeping different institutional frameworks and supporting languages other than French and English as a
threat to the unity of the country. One article compares the situation of ethnic
nationalism beyond French and English to the situation of the Balkans, “from which
grew two world wars” (Globe and Mail, September 14, 1967). Consistent with this
fear, the Canadian government avoided this more radical interpretation of
multiculturalism, recognizing only its more symbolic dimension (see Mackey 2002).

**Fighting racism, racializing “culture”**

While there is not much discussion of racism within the two countries in the
articles of the 1960s, since the 1970s, we see an increased denunciation of racism in
both newspapers, and a critique of the folklorization of racially and ethnically
subordinate groups. These trends do not prevent the ongoing shift in the
understanding of culture that treats “culture” as unrelated to the dominant group’s
institutions, language or religion. “culture” gets redefined in this period into the
assumed inherent characteristics of people of color. For articles that take
multiculturalism and racial democracy as positive aspects of the countries’ reality,
these are dissociated from dominant institutions and tied to the inherent “mixture” or
“diversity” of the country’s population. For articles that portray multiculturalism and
racial democracy as problematic, there is an increasing concern — especially since
the 1990s — with changing the “culture” of racially stigmatized groups. In the Jornal
do Brasil — particularly when black activists’ perspectives are cited — changing the
black population’s “culture” means educating black Brazilians about their history and
identity and promoting “black consciousness.” In the Globe and Mail, changing the
culture of racial and ethnic minorities means promoting “cultural enrichment,” “cross-cultural understanding,” and the teaching of English.

Defenders of racial democracy in 1970s Jornal do Brasil articles often explain it as a product of the mixed bodies of the Brazilian people and no longer as an inheritance of the Portuguese Christian civilization. An article in 1972 states that “[d]espite what we still need to do, racial democracy is firmly implanting itself in the mestiço, culturally uniform, and increasingly moreno nation,” and that “we originate from a rich interaction of races that is still in process, forming the exemplar Brazilian racial democracy” (Jornal do Brasil, September 25, 1972). Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Jornal do Brasil also shows social scientists and historians critiquing Freyrean “culturalist” explanations of Brazilian slavery and race relations, in particular, the claim that Portuguese colonialism and Brazilian slavery were less cruel than English or American ones; but in doing so, they sometimes replace it with another “culturalist” explanation, linking Brazilian authoritarianism with its “Iberian political tradition” (Jornal do Brasil, January 22, 1983).

From the 1980s onward, the voices of black activists appear in the Jornal do Brasil and critique “culturalism” and the “folklorization” of black culture. They nonetheless re-create and support the institutionalization of the idea of black culture in order to raise the self-esteem of black Brazilians and fight the myth of racial democracy. A cartoon in the Jornal do Brasil by Ykenga (Bonifácio Matos) portrays a black man using a cane labeled “Afro-Brazilian culture” to fight three beasts: a dragon/snake-like animal labeled “myth of marginality,” a dog with sharp teeth labeled “myth of racial democracy,” and a bat with a biting dog’s face labeled “myth
of whitening” (Jornal do Brasil, May 12, 1985). In a 1997 article, Friar David dos Santos — a central figure in the struggle for affirmative action — is described as recovering “African culture to awaken the self-esteem of the descendants of slaves.”

The article recounts him suggesting to the mayor of the municipality of Nilópolis that the municipality should include the teaching of Capoeira in the schools so that students “will learn a bit of the history of slavery and black culture in Brazil” (Jornal do Brasil, January 19, 1997).

Beginning in the 1990s, some articles quote black activists employed in government positions as referring to black “culture” and, sometimes, biology, as an inherent part of the diversity of the Brazilian population. In a 1996 article, Benedita da Silva, then a senator from the Workers’ Party, highlights the need to fight for the citizenship of the black people (“povo negro”) and to remove black people from their marginalized condition, “so that we can be proud to live among a multiplicity of races and cultures” (Jornal do Brasil, May 13, 1996). An article by Dulce Maria Pereira, President of the Palmares Cultural Foundation — under the Brazilian ministry of culture — remembers the celebration of the Dia Nacional da Consciência Negra as an opportunity to rethink the myth that Brazil is a racial democracy. She describes the foundation’s mission as to “revise, preserve, value Afro-Brazilian culture and work toward the inclusion of blacks in the country’s development process.” She then cites several government initiatives geared toward recognizing a culturally and biologically specific black population; for instance, the ministry of health’s policies to study the prevalence of diseases “specific to the black race,” the ministry of culture’s historical data collection from museums around the world about “the
trajectory of Africans in Brazil, and black Brazilians in the colonial period” and the
ministry of education’s work on a chapter in the national curriculum which is
dedicated to “cultural plurality” (Jornal do Brasil, November 27, 2000).

Emphasis on “black culture” in the Jornal do Brasil recognizes “structural”
issues like racism and social inequality, and highlights Afro-Brazilians’ historical
agency. However, narratives critiquing — or defending — racial democracy, never
address Brazil’s historical or contemporary linguistic and religious assimilationist
pressures. One article, for example, after being critical of racial democracy and
denouncing racism, reproduces the stigma of lower-class Portuguese by saying that a
homeless man “made a grammar mistake but said the truth” (Jornal do Brasil, March
25, 2000). The “grammar mistake” is in fact the result of a linguistic diglossia
between Brazilians of different social classes, and of the fact that Brazilian
Portuguese grammar suffered modifications as it was historically learned by
Afrodescendant and Indigenous peoples (Lucesci 2008). While for modern linguists
there is no such thing as “wrong” grammar among native speakers of any language,
class stereotyping and educational exclusion based on grammatical differences are
quite common in Brazil.

In the Globe and Mail of the 1970s, “visible minorities” are portrayed as
contesting the Canadian governments’ symbolic focus on “culture” and redirecting
multicultural institutions toward anti-racism. A 1972 article on the Heritage Ontario
Congress, charged with developing a bilingual and multicultural policy for Ontario,
quotes Frank Moritsugu, a Japanese-Canadian and one of the coordinators for the
congress, as saying that “the third generation of Japanese Canadians, children of
parents who reacted to wartime internment by becoming more middle-class, Waspishly Canadian than middle-class, Wasp Canadians, has suddenly become aware that, like it or not, they are a visible minority” (Globe and Mail, June 2, 1972). By the 1980s the Globe and Mail reports on several local and national government multiculturalism institutions as addressing racism.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, critiques of racism and “folklorization” happen in a context of increased visibility of immigrants in cities like Toronto, which, though sometimes considered a source of economic prosperity and cultural richness, are often seen as needing to be “managed.” In one 1980s article, the chairman of the Metro Toronto Board of Police Commissioners is paraphrased as saying that the police budget needs to be increased because “the multicultural nature of Toronto’s population is putting the 5,400-member [police] force under constant pressure from the community for more foot patrols, community service officers and policemen to work with people of various racial backgrounds” (Globe and Mail, January 8, 1981). Government institutions in charge of multiculturalism are thus reported as being tasked simultaneously with combatting racism and assimilating immigrants, while attaching “multiculturalism” to immigrants' bodies. A 1981 article quotes British Columbia’s education minister’s claim that “there are tensions and potential problems there [in British Columbia schools] — particularly when you have school populations where 40 per cent of the students are of non-English background.” A report on this issue is quoted as saying that the government should not only teach English as a second language but also commit to “the implementation of programs for both teachers and students aimed at improving race relations in schools instead of simply
recogniz[ing] and legitimiz[ing] East Indian ceremonies and Ukrainian dances.” (Globe and Mail, June 27, 1981). Ten years later, another article describes how Scarborough, in the suburbs of Toronto, is dealing with its growing Asian and black immigrant population, through both anti-racism and cultural “enrichment” programs tasked with “assessing the abilities of newly arrived students, explaining school rules and practices, defusing racial incidents and dealing with culture shock.” (Globe and Mail, January 3, 1991).

But this “multicultural” population is also sometimes described as a positive source of economic vitality and cosmopolitanism, which comes not from its creativity, intelligence, or prior education but from its inherent characteristics. In the 1980s, one article praises Toronto’s storefronts advertising in many languages, “adapting to the vast multicultural market that is Metro Toronto” (Globe and Mail, January 3, 1989). In another article in the 1990s, a Canadian band is described as being successful because “it’s the kind of musical cocktail that could only be produced when the influences of Italy, India and the West Indies are stirred together and strained through a life-time of listening to pop radio.” Multiculturalism is good and innovating not because musicians are smart and creative, but, as the author later explains, because each band member has brought their own distinct “ethnic” family traditions to the band’s work (Globe and Mail, January 3, 1996). By the 2000s, this urban view of multiculturalism becomes nationalized and, similar to Brazilian racial democracy, multiculturalism becomes a national identity based on ‘tolerance’ tied to the diversity of second-generation, visible minority Canadians.
As multiculturalism becomes increasingly associated with the racialized urban populations of cities like Toronto, and as the English-Canadian language and other practices become “unmarked,” Quebec’s continued demands for autonomy and for French language institutions are increasingly seen as unreasonable, dangerous, and/or detached from the politics of diversity. In the 1990s, an article describes a scene of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien being lost and confused in election of parliament members representing Toronto's districts between “a man named Ianno’ and ‘a woman named Chow.” While Toronto neighborhoods like “Trinity-Spadina is a monument to multiculturalism and diversity’ the article adds that ‘It is not a world familiar to Mr. Chrétien, who grew up in the white-bread homogeneity of small-town Quebec.” An immigrant from Guyana is quoted as saying that, if Quebec separates from Canada “I don’t think it will make a difference.” An Italian-Canadian man says “If they want to be their own little country, fine. They can pay back the money they owe us.” (Globe and Mail, June 5 1997).

“Diverse” populations vs. “liberal” states?

While some newspaper articles praise “diversity,” others argue that this diversity is dividing the nation, provoking internal conflict, and threatening democracy. Minorities deemed non-conforming (black activists in Brazil and religious Muslims in Canada) are sometimes defined as “tribal” or “barbaric,” and contrasted to the apparently liberal, democratic, and cultureless dominant institutions. In the new millennium, adopting affirmative action and other “race conscious”
policies in Brazil is seen as threatening to Brazil’s racial harmony, and the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the United States spark a debate about the threat of Muslim immigrants to national security and Canada’s liberal values.

In the Jornal do Brasil, some articles that criticize affirmative action and black consciousness-raising draw a contrast between a liberal ideal and a “tribal” mentality of black activists. In one article, the editors of a student newspaper from Rio de Janeiro's Catholic university (PUC-Rio), called “The Individual,” which generated controversy on campus for arguing against black consciousness-raising, states that ‘In a time when we talk a lot about collectivities, of the excluded, of those without something (and all of us are without something. . .) of the old proletariat [...] of the tribes, etc., all that we want is to speak from one human being to the other. Because this is how things are. Individual.” (Jornal do Brasil, November 11, 1997). Another article defends racial democracy as a reality derived from Brazilian’s race mixture, adding that a healthy society should strive for “liberty, equality and fraternity” and that, in contrast, affirmative action would take Brazil back to a pre-historic “tribal” mentality, creating racial divisions (Jornal do Brasil, February 6, 2005).

Similarly, in the 1990s, several articles describe Canada as a civic, liberal democracy: a “free society.” For example, Sheila Finestone, Federal Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women, is quoted as saying that “In my view, there isn’t any one Canadian identity. Canada has no national culture.” After some questioning she says: “Well, I think our national culture is fairness and equality and equal opportunities” (Globe and Mail, January 1, 1996). One can also see the idea of a “free society” appearing in constitutional debates, by inclusion of
democracy as one of the “Canadian values.” The Canada clause would be “a statement of Canadian values in the Constitution. . . It should include a recognition of Canada’s distinct society, recognition of our linguistic duality’ along with, among other things, Canada’s multiculturalism and democracy” (Globe and Mail, June 1 1992).

In this view, the liberal nation-state has to deal with the problems of illiberal cultural “others” – in particular, Muslims and immigrants from the Global South -- imposing a limit on multiculturalism. One article argues, commenting on the Salman Rushdie affair and its critics, states that “The delicate balance holding a multicultural Canada in harmony is the secular nature of the state as well as the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution, of ‘freedom of conscience and religion’ and ‘freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression.’ […] The alternative is some kind of theocratic terror-states, perhaps policed by multicultural mullahs” (Globe and Mail, January 6, 1993). In a more recent article, Jason Kenney, conservative Minister for Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism is quoted as commenting on a murder of a Muslim girl by her father, saying that “multiculturalism is not an excuse, or a moral or legal justification, for such barbaric practices. Multiculturalism does not equal cultural relativism” (Globe and Mail, June 16, 2010). Here, by reference to barbarism, the idea of Canada as “civilization” is implicitly evoked.

By the turn of the 20th century, religious issues, though prominent in the Globe and Mail’s articles on multiculturalism, are largely understood as characteristics of individuals, and unrelated to institutions. But one, unusual, exception illuminates the dynamics of contemporary approaches to “culture.” In
2009, the newspaper reports an amendment to the Alberta's Human Rights, Citizenship, and Multiculturalism Act, which allows parents to excuse children from class if they object to materials taught dealing “explicitly with religion, sexuality or sexual orientation.” The article describes the bill as being mainly supported by Alberta’s conservative Christians. While critical of the bill as infringing on sexual minority rights, the article did not link its support to particular racial or ethnic groups, or used as one of the pitfalls of “multiculturalism” tolerating “too much” cultural diversity — as conservative Christianity is not understood as defining a racial or ethnic minority group.

Discussion and conclusion

In the social sciences, the switch from “race” to “culture” is often attributed to the work of Franz Boas and the discipline of Anthropology which he helped found (e.g., Lentin 2005). Boas's claims about “cultural” distinction is partly based on his study of the Inuit from northern Canada which, he argued, were different not because of their biology, but because of the different cultural context in which they lived (Stocking 1966; Baehre 2008). A student of Boas, Gilberto Freyre also brought “culture” to the understanding of race in Brazil, arguing for understanding of his country as the fusion of the cultures of Portuguese, African and Indigenous peoples.

But the story is not as straightforward as it seems. The biological racism that Boas rejected did not preclude a theory of culture, but in fact relied on it. Stocking (1966) traced a development in Boas's own writings, which replaces an older idea of culture as equivalent to “civilization” with a newer idea of different “cultures” as
being equally sophisticated and valid. In the 19th century, and even in Nazi Germany, the idea of “civilization” (and the old idea of “culture”) was intimately tied to scientific racism. It provided an evolutionary perspective where societies progressed to increasing levels of civilization and biologically more advanced ‘races’ were also able to develop higher levels of civilization. In such contexts, racist and colonial elites sought to “civilize” non-white, colonial populations, as well as marginal white populations, such as white women and working-class whites. For racist elites, white superiority had to be nurtured rather than taken for granted (Bonnett 2000; Geulen 2011). The idea of “cultures” has not promoted more equality between peoples as Boas might have hoped, but has taken the place of “customs,” formerly attributed to peoples deemed less cultured or civilized.

This paper's analysis suggests that the idea of “civilization,” and its ties to race, is still with us, albeit often implicitly. Critics of multiculturalism, mestizaje and diversity frameworks have rightly argued that the idea of “culture” embedded in them often reifies racial and ethnic differences and silences discussion about racism and power relations. But an understanding of “race” and racism as simply a mechanism of material exclusion devoid of culture ignores the broader connection between racism and the culturally assimilationist legacies of colonialism and neo-colonial nation-building. The processes of colonization and racialization in the Americas did not only subject individuals to violence, exploitation, exclusion and stereotyping, but also institutionalized the imposition of European languages, religion and other practices considered “civilized” on populations of non-European origin.
Between the 1960s and the late 20th century, the topic of racism increased in visibility in the newspaper material analyzed, while the idea of “civilization” lost its racial and ethnic visibility but remained implicitly powerful. The dominant “culture” — or “civilization” — was visible and explicit in both the Jornal do Brasil’s discourse about racial democracy and the Globe and Mail’s discourse about multiculturalism in the 1950s and 1960s. This “culture” was seen as a set of practices carried out by dominant group members tied to “mainstream” institutions like schools, churches, the government, literature, etc., which could and should be learned by minorities, colonized people, etc. Since the 1980s, debates about racial democracy in the Jornal do Brasil and multiculturalism in the Globe and Mail both began portraying “culture” as embodied characteristics of people of color.

These two newspapers placed different emphases on social class and material inequality, as well as on language and religion, but they racialized and individualized “culture” in similar ways. The Globe and Mail discussions of multiculturalism recognize linguistic and religious diversity. But language and religion are portrayed as embodied characteristics of immigrants and “visible minorities,” while dominant institutions are often portrayed as secular, liberal and democratic, and the dominant language is seen as just a useful skill. The Globe and Mail’s discussion of multiculturalism downplays about class inequality and identities, often attributing the challenges of poor, urban “visible minorities” to their cultural deficiencies, requiring policing, “cultural enrichment,” and ESL programs. In more recent articles from the Jornal do Brasil, both sides of the political spectrum recognize the presence of class inequality, and black consciousness discourse often centers on denouncing racism.
and demanding the inclusion of black Brazilians in dominant institutions. But these articles are silent about linguistic diglossia and say very little about religious diversity, and how these may be correlated with racism and class disadvantage.

Paying attention to colonial legacies and their “civilizational” projects also allows us to think of multiculturalism and racial democracy as tied to imaginaries that transcend the nation-state. Initially, the newspaper articles analyzed here justified attempts to maintain the two nation-states’ integrity and distinctiveness from other nation-states. “culture,” in particular language and religion, was central to this effort. But the national aspect of this culture could not be taken for granted. Portuguese was the language of Portugal and its empire, and English was the language of the United States. Canadian English-speaking nationalists thus sought the membership of French-Canadians as a way to create national identity, initiating official multiculturalism. Brazilian racial democracy rhetoric gradually moved away from Portugal and more toward Africa, and was ultimately rejected. Over time, discourse on racial democracy in Brazil and multiculturalism in Canada portrayed the dominant “cultures” or “civilizations” as less particular (the Luso-Brazilian, the English-Canadians) and were instead increasingly framed as universal, and as tasked with managing the “diversity” of urban populations.

The newspaper discourses analyzed rarely discuss Indigenous people. This suggests that, at least for a certain group of relatively educated and regionally “unmarked” Canadians and Brazilians, Indigenous peoples were not central to their national imaginaries in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This is consistent with previous literature that has noted the tendency of settler societies to imagine
Indigenous peoples as “vanishing” in these countries' national imaginaries (Lesser 1999; Day 2000; Mackey 2002). This makes the Canadian and Brazilian cases different from those Latin American countries’ discourses of mestizaje and multiculturalism where Indigenous presence is much more central to the construction of national imaginaries and diversity policies. The implications of greater Indigenous visibility and centrality to the racialized and cultural construction of national imaginaries is an important question for future work.

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Carolina Press.


Reconciliation Commission of Canada.”

http://www.myrobust.com/websites/trcinstitution/File/Reports/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf,


### Table 1 – Number of articles sampled, by decade

**Articles that appeared from initial keyword search**

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**Articles selected for the analysis**

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Figure 1 - Categories, topics and framings mentioned in association with “racial democracy” in
Jornal do Brasil and “multicultural/multiculturalism” in the Globe and Mail