PHL 2110 Homepage

SYLLABUS

READINGS

• Jan. 14
  • Chapter 2 of Putting Logic in its Place, by David Christensen
  • "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?", by Jonathan Vogel
  • "Epistemic Closure", selection from Chapter 1 of Knowledge and Lotteries, by John Hawthorne
  • Optional: "The Epistemic Closure Principle", in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by Steven Luper
• Jan. 21
  • Chapter 3 of Choices, by Michael D. Resnik
    • Skip section 3-2a
• Jan. 28
  • "The Preface Paradox", by Sharon Ryan
  • "The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality", by Dana Nelkin
• Feb. 4
  • "Defeasible Reasoning", by John L. Pollock
  • "The Paradox of the Preface", by John L. Pollock
  • Ch. 3, section 9 of Cognitive Carpentry, by John L. Pollock
    • Another (maybe simpler) presentation of Pollock's solution to the preface paradox.
• Feb. 11
  • "A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability", by Igor Douven
  • "The Preface Paradox Revisited", by Igor Douven and Jos Uffink
• Feb. 25
• "Generalizing the Lottery Paradox", by Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson
• "The Lottery Paradox and our Epistemic Goal", by Igor Douven
• Mar. 4
  • Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of Betting on Theories, by Patrick Maher
• Mar. 11
  • "Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis", by Richard Foley
  • Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of Putting Logic in its Place, by David Christensen
• Mar. 18
  • "The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning", by Steven A. Sloman
  • "In Two Minds: Dual-process Accounts of Reasoning", by Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
  • "Systems and Levels: Dual-system Theories and the Personal–Subpersonal Distinction", by Keith Frankish
  • "Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief", by Keith Frankish
• Mar. 25
  • "Reliabilism Leveled", by Jonathan Vogel
  • "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge", by Stewart Cohen

NOTES

• Jan. 7: Basics and Background
• Jan. 14: Closure
• Jan. 21: Probability
• Jan. 28: Ryan and Nelkin
• Feb. 4: Pollock
• Feb. 11: Douven
• Feb. 25: More Douven
• Mar. 4: Maher
• Mar. 11: Foley & Christensen
• Mar. 18: The Empirical Angle (Jennifer Nagel)
  • Background
  • Dual-process Psychology: Sloman, Evans, and Frankish