Gabor Virag

Gabor Virag

Associate Professor (Business Economics)
Management

 

REAL WORLD EXPERTISE & COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS

Gabor Virag joined the University of Toronto after spending 7 years as a faculty member at the Economics Department of the University of Rochester. He received his bachelor degree in Economics from the Budapest University of Economic Sciences, and a Master's degree in Economics from the Central European University. Then he obtained a PhD in Economics from Princeton University in 2004.

SCHOLARSHIP & RESEARCH

Gabor's research papers have been published in journals like Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, and Theoretical Economics. His main research interest is in Economic Theory. In particular, he studies decentralized market interaction using the tools of auction theory and search theory. He has also worked on online auctions, studying whether empirical bidding patterns confirm theoretical predictions. He has taught courses in Mathematical Economics and Industrial Organization in Rochester, and is currently teaching graduate and undergraduate courses in Finance.

Education
Ph.D., Princeton University
M.A., Central European University
B.A., Budapest University of Economic Sciences

Publications

 

  • First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders; Economic Theory; 2013
  • Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect; with Stephan Lauermann; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 2012
  • High Profit Equilibria in Directed Search Models; Games and Economic Behavior; 2011
  • Market Power and efficiency in a Search Model; with Manolis Galenianos, Philipp Kricher; International Economic Review; 2011
  • Skill Requirement, Search Frictions, and Wage Inequality; with Lawrence Uren; International Economic Review; 2011
  • Competing Auctions: finite markets and convergence; Theoretical Economics; 2010
  • Gambling by Auctions; with Yaron Raviv; International Journal of Industrial Organization; 2009
  • Efficiency and Competition in the Long Run: the Survival of the Unfit; Games and Economic Behavior; 2009
  • Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two Party Elections; Journal of Public Economic Theory; 2008
  • Repeated Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders; Games and Economic Behavior; 2007
  • Buyer Heterogeneity and Competing Mechanisms; 2007
  • Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling; with Jozsef Molnar; Economics Letters; 2007
  • Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Model; with Stephan Lauermann, Wolfram Merzyn
 

Research

Market interaction, Theoretic models, Market conduct